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APPENDIX: TEXT AND PRECEDENT FOR
REPRESENTATIONAL ADEQUACY CLAIMS UNDER FIFTY
STATE CONSTITUTIONS

CHRISTOPHER S. ELMENDORF*
This Appendix supplements the Article, From Educational Adequacy to Representational Adequacy: A New Template for Legal Attacks on Partisan Gerrymanders in the print edition of the William
& Mary Law Review.1 The Appendix provides, in tabular form, a
state-by-state overview of textual and precedential toeholds for the
“representational adequacy” claims that the article proposes and
defends. The table indicates whether the state constitution features
a “free and open” or “free and equal” elections clause; a guarantee
of “equal voting power”; and specific prohibitions about undue favoritism or lack of competition in the design of legislative districts. It
also notes whether school-finance plaintiffs have scored any victories, and whether the state’s courts have held any education claims
nonjusticiable. Because nonjusticiability rulings are specific to a
legal theory or requested remedy, a state may have experienced
both plaintiff victories and nonjusticiability holdings in education
cases. (I reference nonjusticiability holdings in the table not because
they necessarily foreclose representational adequacy claims, but
because they are precedents that would have to be distinguished.)
In the Article, I recommended bringing the initial representational adequacy claims in states with either (1) express limitations on
favoritism in districting, or (2) generally worded electoral guaran-

* Martin Luther King, Jr. Professor of Law, University of California, Davis. Thanks to
Rac Pimentel and Ken Wang for doing the lion’s share of the research for this Appendix.
1. Christopher S. Elmendorf, From Educational Adequacy to Representational
Adequacy: A New Template for Legal Attacks on Partisan Gerrymanders, 59 WM . & MARY L.
REV . 1601 (2018).

121

Published by William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository, 2018

1

William & Mary Law Review Online, Vol. 59 [2018], Art. 6

122

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 59:121

tees and favorable education precedents.2 The twenty-two states
that meet one or both of these criteria are highlighted.

State

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada

Free & Equal
Districts: Schools:
Schools:
Open, Voting
Undue
Plaintiff
7
Nonjusticiability
Equal3 Power4 Favoritism5 Victory6
W8
U9

U
U

U10

U
U
U
U

W11

U
U
12

U

U
U13

W14

U15
U
W16
W17

U
U
U
U
U

U

U
U

18

U

U
U
W19

U
U
U

W20
U
W21

2. See id. Part III.D.
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State

New
Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
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Free & Equal
Districts: Schools:
Schools:
Open, Voting
Undue
Plaintiff
7
Nonjusticiability
Equal3 Power4 Favoritism5 Victory6
U

U22

U

U
U
U23
U24

W25

U
U
U
U
U
U

U
U
U
U
U
U
U26
U

U29

W27
W28

U
U
U

U
U
U
U

U
U30
31

U
U

U
U
U

3. Information in this column is from the Appendix in Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to
Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND . L. REV . 89, 144-49 (2014). The reader is referred
to Douglas’s paper for citations to the state constitution in question.
4. Included here are constitutions that provide for an “equal right to elect,” or something
similarly evocative of equal voting power.
5. A check in this column indicates that the section of the state constitution addressing
legislative districts spells out criteria or objectives that go beyond “traditional” notions about
territorial community, compactness, and the minimization of political subdivision splits,
which might be used to anchor representational adequacy claims about partisan/ideological
symmetry or responsiveness. Several constitutions include specific protections for the voting
power of racial or ethnic minorities, which are not referenced here because I do not see how
they could support more general claims about representational adequacy.
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6. A check in this column indicates that the state is currently coded as a “plaintiff
victory” state or a “mixed” state per the website SchoolFunding.Info. See Summary of School
Funding Court Cases (1973-2017), SCHOOL FUNDING .INFO , http://schoolfunding.info/litigationmap/ [https://perma.cc/PE57-2P35] (providing summaries of judicial decisions in each state).
In a handful of the plaintiff victories, the court relied on an equity/equal protection theory
rather than an adequacy theory. Because the line between “adequacy” and “equity” theories
is indistinct, see William S. Koski, Of Fuzzy Standards and Institutional Constraints: A Reexamination of the Jurisprudential History of Educational Finance Reform Litigation, 43
SANTA CLARA L. REV . 1185, 1187-88 (2003); James E. Ryan, Standards, Testing, and School
Finance Litigation, 86 TEX . L. REV . 1223, 1233-36 (2008), and because a state court that
reads the state constitution’s equal protection guarantee expansively in education cases
might well do the same in representation cases (going beyond federal interpretations of equal
protection under the U.S. Constitution in both domains), this Appendix does not distinguish
equity and adequacy holdings.
7. States with the cautionary “W” in this column are those whose courts have rejected
at least one education rights claim on justiciability grounds. Bear in mind that some of these
holdings might be distinguished in a future case, particularly if the plaintiff develops a “legislative duty” theory that does not require the court to pass on the actual quality of schools (or
representation) in the context of the particular case. See Christopher S. Elmendorf & Darien
Shanske, Solving “Problems No One Has Solved”: Courts, Causal Inference, and the Right
to Education, 2018 U. ILL . L. REV . (forthcoming) (manuscript at 19-24). Additionally, in some
other states, courts issued rulings for the defendant that, while not explained in justiciability/separation-of-powers terms, have the effect of foreclosing claims (such as, by adopting
a conventional rational basis standard of review).
8. Ex Parte James, 836 So. 2d 813, 818-19 (Ala. 2002) (per curiam).
9. ARIZ . CONST . art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(14)(F) (“To the extent practicable, competitive districts
should be favored where to do so would create no significant detriment to the other goals.”);
id. § 1(15) (“Party registration and voting history data shall be excluded from the initial
phase of the mapping process but may be used to test maps for compliance with the above
goals. The places of residence of incumbents or candidates shall not be identified or considered.”).
10. CAL . CONST . art. XXI, § 2(e) (“The place of residence of any incumbent or political
candidate shall not be considered in the creation of a map. Districts shall not be drawn for
the purpose of favoring or discriminating against an incumbent, political candidate, or
political party.”).
11. See Vergara v. State, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (effectively applying
rational basis review to state education code).
12. DEL . CONST . art. II, § 2A (stating that districts shall “not be so created as to unduly
favor any person or political party”).
13. FLA . CONST . art. III, § 21(a) (“No apportionment plan or district shall be drawn with
the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent.”).
14. Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400, 406-07
(Fla. 1996) (per curiam).
15. HAW . CONST . art. IV, § 6 (“No district shall be so drawn as to unduly favor a person
or political faction.”).
16. Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1192-93 (Ill. 1996).
17. Bonner ex rel. Bonner v. Daniels, 907 N.E.2d 516, 522 (Ind. 2009).
18. MASS . CONST . pt. 1, art. IX (“[T]he inhabitants of this commonwealth ... have an equal
right to elect officers, and to be elected, for public employments.”).

https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlronline/vol59/iss1/6

4

Elmendorf: Appendix: Text and Precedent for Representational Adequacy Claims

2018]

EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY APPENDIX

125

19. See Mich. Educ. Ass’n v. Superintendent of Pub. Instruction, 724 N.W.2d 478 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2006) (dismissing challenge to state education fund expenditure for lack of standing).
20. Comm. for Educ. Equal. v. State, 294 S.W.3d 477, 488, 494 (Mo. 2009).
21. Neb. Coal. for Educ. Equity & Adequacy (Coal.) v. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d 164, 180-83
(Neb. 2007).
22. N.H. CONST . pt.1, art. XI (“[E]very inhabitant of the state of 18 years of age and
upwards shall have an equal right to vote in any election.”).
23. N.D. CONST . art. IV, § 2 (“The legislative assembly shall guarantee, as nearly as is
practicable, that every elector is equal to every other elector in the state in the power to cast
ballots for legislative candidates.”).
24. OHIO CONST . art. XI, § 6(A) (“No general assembly district plan shall be drawn
primarily to favor or disfavor a political party.”).
25. Okla. Educ. Ass'n v. State ex rel. Okla. Legislature, 158 P.3d 1058, 1065-66 (Okla.
2007).
26. Though not coded as “plaintiff victory” or “mixed” by SchoolFunding.Info, I have so
coded Oregon here because the state’s supreme court did in fact rule for the plaintiffs on the
constitutional sufficiency of school funding. See Pendleton Sch. Dist. 16R v. State, 200 P.3d
133 (Or. 2009). At the remedy stage, however, the court relied on an unusual provision of the
state constitution that restricted school-finance remedies to the issuance of a report. See id.
at 142, 145.
27. Marrero ex rel. Tabalas v. Commonwealth, 739 A.2d 110, 113-14 (Pa. 1999).
28. City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 56-57 (R.I. 1995).
29. S.C. CONST . art. I, § 5 (“[E]very inhabitant of this State possessing the qualifications
provided for in this Constitution shall have an equal right to elect officers and be elected to
fill public office.”).
30. WASH . CONST . art. II, § 43(5) (“The commission's plan shall not be drawn purposely
to favor or discriminate against any political party or group.”).
31. W. VA . CONST . art. II, § 4 (“Every citizen shall be entitled to equal representation in
the government, and, in all apportionments of representation, equality of numbers of those
entitled thereto, shall as far as practicable, be preserved.”).
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